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Cet article examine les étapes entreprises par les Nations 
Unies depuis ses débuts en1945 pour promouvoir et protéger 
les droits des femme à l’intérieur de ses cadres et critique les 
stratégies qui sont inadéquates jusqu’au détriment des droits 
des femmes. Elle considère que spécialiser leurs droits lors de 
l’adoption par les Nations Unies a marginalisé leurs droits 
et transformé le système en place. Elle ajoute que si cette 
dernière stratégie avait été exécutée adéquatement et liée aux 
précédentes, la protection et la promotion pour les droits des 
femmes auraient été assurées à l’intérieur des Nations Unies.
“All human beings, men and women, are equal in dig-
nity and rights.” Thus reads Article 1 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). It is clear that 
the international framework for the promotion and pro-
tection of human rights as set up by the United Nations 
(UN) shortly after the Second World War was intended 
to promote and protect the rights of all, men and women. 
Both the Charter of the UN of 1945, which provides the 
foundation of the international human rights system as 
we know it today, and the UDHR that was adopted three 
years later, recognize that all human beings have human 
rights for the simple reason of being human.1 The Charter 
forbids discrimination on the basis of race, sex, language, 
or religion (UN Charter, Art. 1).
 
Likewise, the UDHR 
lays down that everyone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in the Declaration, without distinction 
of any kind, including according to sex (UDHR Art. 2). 
However, the aims to promote and protect the rights of 
all are not realized. The system was, and to some extent still 
is, androcentric. In the past, it was successfully argued by 
women’s rights proponents that the international system 
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addresses only degrading events commonly identified 
with the lives of men, and not experiences common to the 
lives of women.2
 
A study of the work of the UN Human 
Rights Committee and the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights shows that improvement has 
been made, but also that much still remains to be done 
(Van Leeuwen 246-251). Questions to be posed therefore 
are: What steps has the UN taken since its inception to 
promote and protect women’s enjoyment of human rights 
within its human rights framework, and why have these 
strategies not (yet) led to the desired result?
This paper addresses these questions. It looks at the 
steps the UN has taken since its inception in 1945 to pro-
mote and protect women’s rights within its human rights 
framework, and discusses the criticism of these strategies 
for being inadequate and, arguably, even detrimental to 
women’s human rights. After this introduction, this paper 
starts by discussing the UN system for the promotion and 
protection of human rights as it was set up in 1945. As 
it was a time in which few if any women enjoyed equal 
rights (many women did not, for example, have the right 
to vote or to hold public office), the UN’s first step was to 
grant women the same rights that men had. But, as will be 
shown, having the same rights as men did not necessarily 
mean that women’s human rights were effectively promoted 
and protected. Abuses and constraints that characteristically 
affect women because they are women—like rape, domestic 
violence, and forced sterilization—were not addressed by 
the international human rights system, and discrimination 
against women persisted.
In order to remedy this deficiency of its human rights 
system, in 1979 the UN adopted the Convention on the 
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(the Women’s Convention)—a convention that focuses 
solely on the enjoyment of human rights by women. This 
paper discusses this strategy of specialization of women’s 
rights by the UN and shows that this second strategy also 
failed to deliver the desired result. For although women’s 
rights were now expressly placed within the ambit of the 
international human rights framework, women’s rights 
were still not addressed in the mainstream human rights 
system.3 It was argued by feminist legal scholars that this 
strategy of specialization had led to the marginalization 
of women’s human rights (Charlesworth “Not Waving” 
1; Reanda 12; O’Hare 367-368). 
In order to address this problem of marginalization of 
women’s rights in the mainstream human rights ambit, 
in 1993 the UN instigated its most recent strategy to 
promote and protect women’s rights within its human 
rights framework: gender mainstreaming, requiring a 
transformation of the mainstream human rights system. 
This strategy of transformation has thus far also failed to 
achieve the desired result, and more research is required. 
However, it is argued in this paper that when executed 
properly this latest strategy, taken together with the pre-
vious strategies, promises to offer effective promotion and 
protection of women’s human rights in the UN human 
rights framework.
The First Step: Same Rights
The Charter of the UN, adopted in 1945 by fifty-one 
States, provides the foundation of the international human 
rights system as we know it today. As noted previously, 
the Charter and the UDHR recognise that all human 
beings have human rights for the simple reason of being 
human (UN Charter, Art. 1, para. 3 and UDHR, Art. 
2). The Declaration speaks purposefully when it holds in 
Article 1 that all human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights.
Although reference was made to all men in the original 
draft of the document, it is clear that all parties involved 
in the drafting process agreed that women were just as 
entitled to the rights laid down in the Declaration as 
men. The original wording was heavily contested during 
the negotiations (Morsink 233). Some members of the 
drafting committee argued that since it was clear that 
both men and women should be able to enjoy human 
rights, the terminology of all men could be misleading. 
Mr. Koretsky, the Russian delegate, for example, held that 
the assumption that all men included all persons implied 
a historical reflection on the mastery of men over women 
(Morsink 233). He wanted the wording to be changed 
so as to make clear that all human beings were included. 
Agreement was subsequently found amongst the members 
on reference to all human beings (Morsink 223-236). 
The notion that both men and women should be 
able to enjoy their human rights is part and parcel of all 
the main international human rights instruments. Not 
only do the documents that compose the so-called Bill 
of Human Rights—the UDHR and the two Covenants: 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)—refer explicitly 
to the principles of non-discrimination and equality, 
but also more specialized human rights treaties such as 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 
UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families lay 
down that States parties shall respect and ensure the rights 
as laid down therein without distinction of any kind. 
These documents thus grant human rights to women 
on an equal basis with men—i.e., women should have 
the same rights men have. 
This notion of formal equality of men and women as 
it was codified by the UN in its human rights treaties 
did not appear out of thin air. For it was this idea of 
formal equality that was the tenet of the women’s rights 
movement in the period shortly after the Second World 
War—the period when the Charter and subsequently 
the UDHR were adopted (Parisi 571-572). It was a time 
when only thirty of the original fifty-one UN Member 
States had given women equal voting rights or permitted 
them to hold public office. Hence, the most important 
precept of women’s rights proponents at that time was 
that men and women were the same in rational ability 
and capacity for autonomy and self-determination. Their 
main goal was to achieve an equal status in law and 
hence for women to be accorded the same rights as men. 
Consequently, women’s stated equality was based on the 
sameness of men and women, without attention to their 
difference (Parisi 572). This presumption of sameness 
is evident in the principles of non-discrimination and 
equality as laid down in the human rights documents 
that were drawn up after the inception of the UN.
The problem with this strategy lies in the fact that 
women and men are de facto not the same, as they do 
not live similar lives. From the moment of birth, human 
beings are differentiated according to sex, being either 
male or female. Sex is the first factor that defines a hu-
man being in society, and it accordingly places a human 
being in a maze of expectations, customs, practices, and 
constraints that stipulate his/her life. Since the biological 
and gender-related aspects of men and women differ, 
so too do their lives and their experiences. Although no 
such thing as the woman experience or the man experience 
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exists, and although social constructions of man and 
woman—and of masculinity and femininity—differ 
across locations, cultures, and time, it is possible to 
draw general distinctions between the lives of women 
and the lives of men. 
The general picture of gender relations throughout the 
world portrays an asymmetry of power between men and 
women.5 This asymmetry translates itself into certain issues 
that are characteristic of the lives of men, and others that 
are characteristic of the lives of women. 
therefore originated as men’s rights: the male experience 
was accepted as the norm, or, as Parisi notes, as the human 
experience.7 Abuses, exclusions, and constraints that are 
more typical of women’s lives were neither recognized 
nor addressed by the human rights instruments. 
Although a first important step was made by grant-
ing women equal rights, such as the right to vote, the 
international human rights framework did not do what 
it was supposed to do: effectively promote and protect 
women’s enjoyment of human rights.
The failure to take account of these differences in 
the concept of sameness expressed in the international 
human rights treaties references to non-discrimination 
and equality limits the UN human rights system’s ability 
to tackle structures that perpetuate gender hierarchies. 
As noted, women were granted the same rights as men. 
The norms of the international human rights system 
reflected the lives and experiences of the (Western, 
white, heterosexual) male. They signify that when men 
have, for example, a right not to be arbitrarily detained, 
women also have a right not to be arbitrarily detained. 
This is, of course, only fair. But the problem is that such 
a provision—when applied in a traditional sense—serves 
women less than men. 
Rather than arbitrary detention (strictu sensu), women 
are, for example, more often confronted with imprison-
ment in the family home or only being allowed to leave 
the house under male supervision. But these latter issues, 
issues that characteristically affect women because they 
are women, are not addressed by the mainstream human 
rights treaties. 
Critics pointed out that degrading events commonly 
identified mainly with the lives of men were addressed 
in the wording and interpretation of the provisions 
of the human rights instruments. Acts of torture and 
ill treatment—for example during incommunicado 
detention—and the use of excessive force by security 
forces were violations cited in both the wording and the 
interpretation of the human rights treaties, but experi-
ences like rape and domestic violence—events common 
to the lives of many women—were not covered by the 
protection of these provisions.6 In reality, human rights 
The Commission on the Status of Women
The disadvantaged position of women worldwide was of 
concern to many involved in establishing and recognizing 
women’s human rights within the UN. Hence, in 1946, 
even before the adoption of the UDHR, the Economic 
and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC)8 established 
a specialized body to deal with “women’s rights”: the 
Commission on the Status of Women (CSW). Originally, 
the CSW functioned as a sub-commission to the former 
Commission on Human Rights (CHR).9 The institutional 
structure, Parisi notes, “was the result of a compromise 
between those feminists who pushed for full incorporation 
into the existing human rights framework and those who 
thought that the establishment of a separate body would 
be the best way to ensure attention for women’s rights 
issues” (572).
Later that same year, however, the CSW received the 
status of full-fledged Commission and therefore became 
an equal counterpart to the CHR. Amongst those who 
were against this shift in institutional structure was Eleanor 
Roosevelt, who at that time was chairperson of the CHR. 
Roosevelt and other opponents felt that the singling out 
of a group for special rights could lead to stigmatization, 
backlash, and marginalization. For them, the preferable 
alternative was to seek inclusion in the primary UN human 
rights body rather than to try to establish “separate but 
equal” human rights institutional mechanisms for women 
and men (Parisi 572-3). However, proponents of the shift 
considered this promotion in status for women’s human 
rights to be of crucial importance.
It was Bodil Begtrup, the first Chairperson of the 
In reality, human rights therefore originated as men’s rights: the male 
experience was accepted as the norm, or … as the human experience. 
Abuses, exclusions, and constraints that are more typical of women’s lives 
were neither recognized nor addressed by the human rights instruments.
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sub-commission, who requested that ECOSOC provide 
the CSW with full commission status in May 1946. She 
noted that: 
Women’s problems have now for the first time in 
history to be studied internationally as such and to be 
given the social importance they ought to have. And 
it would be, in the opinion of this Sub-Commission 
of experts in this field, a tragedy to spoil this unique 
opportunity by confusing the wish and the facts. 
Some situations can be changed by laws, education, 
and public opinion, and the time seems to have come 
for happy changes in conditions of women all over 
the world. (UNDAW 1-2)
In June 1946, the sub-commission formally became the 
CSW, a body functioning directly under the ECOSOC. Its 
original tasks were to prepare recommendations and reports 
to the ECOSOC on the promotion of women’s rights in 
political, economic, social, and educational fields and to 
make recommendations to the Council on urgent problems 
that required immediate attention, but this mandate has 
expanded over the years.10 It is interesting to note that in 
its first years after coming into being, the CSW played 
an important role in the drafting process of the UDHR. 
The members of the CSW revised draft articles that were 
sent to them for comments and gender-sensitive language, 
and argued against references to men as a synonym for 
humanity and to phrases like “men are brothers”.11 Yet, 
in line with the tenet of the women’s movement at the 
time, its focus was foremost on achieving equal rights for 
women and preventing sexist language in the Declaration 
(Morsink 255-6).
The CSW did not argue in favour of inclusion of pro-
visions in the Declaration that would more clearly reflect 
the lives of women by referring, for example, to domestic 
violence, rape, trafficking, maternal mortality, or access to 
contraceptives. Rather it advocated for full equality of civil 
rights, including the right to dissolution of marriage, the 
right to guardianship, the right to keep one’s nationality, 
and the right to own property (see UN doc. E/281/Rev.1 
at 12). Naturally, in light of the status of women around 
the world at that time, this was an important step. 
In the years to follow, the CSW was involved in pro-
moting women’s rights and equality by setting standards 
and formulating international conventions, and it con-
ducted research to assess the status of women worldwide. 
In that capacity, for example, the Commission drafted 
the Convention on Political Rights of Women of 1952; 
the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women 
of 1957; and the Convention on Consent to Marriage, 
Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration of Marriag-
es of 1962 (Schöpp-Schilling 11-12). In 1963, the UN 
General Assembly (GA) requested that the Commission 
draft a declaration on the elimination of discrimination 
against women.12 It was this Declaration that culminated 
sixteen years later in the Women’s Convention, the text 
of which was prepared by working groups within the 
Commission.13
The Second Step: Special Rights
…Noting however that in various fields there still re-
mains, in fact if not in law, considerable discrimination 
against women. —UN GA Resolution 1921 of 5 
December 1963, preamble.
In 1963, the UN GA requested that ECOSOC invite the 
CSW to prepare a draft declaration on the elimination of 
discrimination against women as it had noted that, despite 
the efforts of the UN, discrimination against women per-
sisted (“Short History,” 7).  The Declaration was adopted by 
the GA in 1967 and enumerates eleven provisions that call 
upon States to, for example, take all appropriate measures 
to educate public opinion with regard to the eradication 
of prejudice and the abolition of customary and all other 
practices that are based on the idea of the inferiority of 
women, and to take all appropriate measures to combat 
all forms of traffic in women (UN GA resolution 2263 
(XXII), articles 3 and 8). 
Yet, despite the efforts of the GA and of various spe-
cialized agencies of the UN, it became clear in 1972 that 
existing treaties alone were not sufficient to adequately 
address discrimination against women (Schöpp-Schilling 
11). The CSW recommended to both ECOSOC and the 
GA that 1975 should become “International Women’s 
Year” to ensure that increased efforts were made to realize 
women’s human rights (Schöpp-Schilling 11). The high-
light of this “International Women’s Year” was the First 
UN World Conference on Women, held in Mexico City. It 
was here that a World Plan of Action was adopted, which 
gave high priority to the preparation and adoption of the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, with effective procedures for its implementation 
(Report of the World Conference of the International 
Women’s Year, para. 198).
It was the CSW that prepared the draft text of this con-
vention. After lengthy negotiations in the CSW and within 
UN working groups of the Third Committee of the GA, 
the GA adopted the Women’s Convention, or CEDAW, on 
18 December 1979 (Schöpp-Schilling 12). The Women’s 
Convention, contrary to the other mainstream human 
rights treaties, focuses on the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women, not as is standard in the 
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other human rights treaties, the elimination of discrimi-
nation on the ground of sex.14 Article 1 of the Convention 
lays down that discrimination “is any distinction, exclusion, 
or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect 
or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, 
enjoyment, or exercise by women—irrespective of their 
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women—of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, civil, or any other field.” In its 
substantive articles, the Women’s Convention addresses 
Human Rights), the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women—the body that monitors 
the implementation of the Women’s Convention—was 
until recently meeting in New York and was serviced 
by the (former) UN Division for the Advancement of 
Women (DAW).16 Although the adoption of the Women’s 
Convention meant that women’s rights were expressly 
placed in the ambit of international human rights, critics 
argued that the rights of women were still ignored by 
the mainstream human rights mechanisms. The claim 
various issues characteristic of the lives of women and 
their enjoyment of human rights. Article 12(2) of the 
Convention, for example, lays down that “States parties 
shall ensure to women appropriate services in connection 
with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, 
granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate 
nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.” 
The adoption of the Women’s Convention meant that 
specific rights for women were for the first time expressly 
placed within the realm of the international human rights 
framework, albeit in a specialized treaty. Hence, from then 
onwards, the UN human rights system aimed to promote 
and protect the enjoyment of human rights by women in 
two ways: through the principles of non-discrimination 
and equality in its mainstream human rights treaties, 
and through these principles in a women-specific human 
rights treaty.
Although the Women’s Convention was originally 
received as a big step forward in the promotion and pro-
tection of women’s human rights, it was also criticized. It 
was argued that the creation of a specific mechanism to 
deal exclusively with the enjoyment of human rights of 
women led to the marginalization of women’s rights.15 
For example, Hilary Charlesworth observes that the 
price of creating separate institutional mechanisms for 
women led to the building of a “women’s ghetto” with 
less power, resources, and priority than the mainstream 
human rights bodies (“Not Waving” 1). Her arguments 
are supported by the fact that unlike the other human 
rights monitoring bodies, which meet in Geneva and 
are serviced by the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (and previously by the former Centre for 
was made by feminist legal scholars and women’s rights 
proponents that the monitoring bodies of the other 
human rights treaties did not address blatant violations 
of women’s dignity as gross violations of human rights 
but left these issues to the specialized CEDAW to deal 
with (Byrnes 205-6).17 As Charlesworth notes, the 
existence of special women’s institutions such as the 
Women’s Convention and CSW allowed comparable but 
male-dominated forums such as the (former) Commission 
on Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) to claim a general mandate that carried greater 
prestige and power than CEDAW (Charlesworth “Trans-
forming the United Nations” 446). The effect of this was 
that women’s interests were ghettoised: the creation of 
“women’s institutions” meant that mainstream human 
rights bodies and institutions tended to downplay the 
application of human rights norms to women on the 
implicit assumption that women’s rights were beyond 
their concern (Charlesworth “Transforming the United 
Nations” 446).18
As is clear from the above, the criticism was that the 
mainstream human rights instruments still did not pay 
attention to women’s rights or, to phrase it differently, to 
situations that affected the enjoyment of human rights by 
women. Consequently, women’s human rights were still the 
poor cousins of the “real” human rights. Thus although, 
or, as some say, because there was now a body in the UN 
human rights system that dealt exclusively with women’s 
human rights, women’s human rights were still not fully 
promoted and protected by the international system (By-
rnes 205-6; Gallagher 285; Johnstone 151; Charlesworth 
“Not Waving” 12; Reanda 12; O’Hare 367-8). 
Although the Women’s Convention was originally received as a big step 
forward in the promotion and protection of women’s human rights, 
it was also criticized. It was argued that the creation of a specific 
mechanism to deal exclusively with the enjoyment of human rights of 
women led to the marginalization of women’s rights.
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The Third Step: Transformation of the Mainstream
The concept of human rights, like all vibrant visions, is 
not static or the property of any group; rather, its meaning 
expands as people reconceive of their needs and hopes in 
relation to it. In this spirit, feminists redefine human 
rights abuses to include the degradation and violation 
of women. The specific experiences of women must be 
added to traditional approaches to human rights in 
order to make women more visible and to transform the 
concept and practice of human rights in our culture so 
that it takes better account of women’s lives. 
—Charlotte Bunch (“Women’s Rights as Human 
Rights” 487)
As mentioned, the first World Conference on Women 
was held in Mexico City in 1975. This conference was 
followed by the second World Conference on Women 
five years later in Copenhagen. And then, in 1985, the 
World Conference to review and appraise the achieve-
ments of the “United Nations Decade for Women: 
Equality, Development, and Peace” was held in Nairobi. 
At these conferences concerns were voiced about the 
effect of special development aid policies for women.19 
Charlesworth observes that the prevailing approach to 
women and development aid was criticized at these 
forums for being inadequate, as it identified women as 
a special interest group within the development sphere 
needing particular accommodation. Hence, the special-
ization of women’s issues in regards to development aid 
was criticized. Strategies were proposed that encouraged 
the integration of women into the existing structures of 
development, i.e., so called “mainstreaming” of women’s 
issues (Charlesworth “Not Waving” 2). The Nairobi 
Conference recognized that women’s equality was not 
an isolated issue and that a woman’s perspective and 
involvement was required on all issues. 
The criticism voiced at these conferences regarding the 
specialisation of women’s issues in development also held 
true for the international human rights framework, for, 
as discussed above women’s issues were only addressed 
by a specialized women’s committee (CEDAW) and not 
by the mainstream human rights bodies. It is therefore 
not surprising that this new trend in the development 
sector of “mainstreaming” women was also proposed as 
a strategy for equality in human rights by the women’s 
movement at the World Conference on Human Rights 
held in Vienna in 1993. The Vienna Conference proved 
to be a landmark event regarding public recognition of the 
lack of attention of the mainstream international human 
rights system for human rights of women. Although the 
focus of this World Conference was originally on human 
rights in general, especially on their universal character, 
and not on women’s rights, a strong lobby of women’s 
rights proponents managed to place the issue of women’s 
human rights on the agenda (see Friedman 313-4). At the 
Vienna Conference, the working group on “integration 
of women’s rights into the human rights agenda” made it 
unequivocally clear to the participating States that much 
of what women experience as everyday abuse in their 
lives—in the family, in violation of their bodies, and in 
terms of economic and political deprivation—was still 
largely kept outside the realm of the international human 
rights community (Bunch “Strengthening” 33). This de-
spite the fact that it was common knowledge that women 
were regularly subjected to battering, torture, humiliation, 
starvation, sexual harassment and exploitation, forced 
marriages and pregnancy, compulsory heterosexuality, 
mutilation, and even murder because of being female 
(Bunch “Strengthening” 33; Boyle 91-92).
The 171 States represented at the Vienna Conference 
acknowledged this deficiency of the international system 
and stated in their final declaration and programme of 
action that the human rights of women and of the girl 
child were an inalienable, integral and indivisible part 
of universal human rights (Vienna Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action, part 1, para. 18). They acknowledged 
that the human rights of women had to be integrated into 
the mainstream of United Nations system-wide activity 
and that these issues had to be regularly and systematically 
addressed throughout relevant United Nations bodies 
and mechanisms. (Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action, part 2, para. 37).20 Moreover, in this Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993, the states 
call upon the monitoring bodies of the international 
human rights treaties to include the status and human 
rights of women in their deliberations and findings (part 
2, para. 42).
The call made at the Vienna Conference for integration 
of the status and human rights of women is one trans-
formation of the mainstream international human rights 
system. The monitoring bodies were not only requested 
to pay attention to issues that affect women’s enjoyment 
of human rights, but also to formulate obligations that 
effectively address these issues, to identify a possible link 
between these issues and discrimination of women and 
address it, and to do so in an integral manner—meaning 
in a manner that does not marginalize these “women’s 
issues” (Van Leeuwen).21 As Charlotte Bunch notes in 
this respect, the concept and practice of human rights 
needed to be transformed so as to take better account of 
women’s lives (“Women’s Rights as Human Rights” 487). 
The author of this paper conducted a study to exam-
ine whether the mainstream international human rights 
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bodies had, in the years after the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, complied with this call. The study 
consisted of an analysis of the work of the HRC and the 
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) in regards to matters that affect women’s physical 
integrity.22 Its results point out that, overall, the work of 
the HRC and the CESCR reflects compliance with three 
of the four necessary elements for transformation: the 
two Committees seem to make good use of the possibil-
ities within their mandates to address issues that affect 
the Committees for addressing certain matters. Although 
there are strong indications that the work of NGOs plays 
a significant role, one can also question to what extent, 
for example, the gender, nationality, or background of 
individual Committee members affects the attention 
paid by the human rights monitoring bodies to issues 
that affect women’s enjoyment of human rights. Further 
research can point to hitches in the process of including 
the status and human rights of women, and indicate ways 
these might be addressed and overcome. 
women’s physical integrity; they formulate obligations 
for States parties that in general take into account the 
gender-specific form, circumstances, and consequences of 
these human rights abuses; and, moreover, these matters 
are addressed in an integrated manner. However, save 
for a few exceptions, the HRC and the CESCR do not 
link specific experiences of women to discrimination of 
women (see Van Leeuwen). Hence, the HRC and the 
CESCR address the symptoms, but not the root cause, of 
human rights abuses and constraints that typically affect 
women’s enjoyment of human rights. The study therefore 
shows that, although the HRC and the CESCR are on the 
right track, more needs to be done for the international 
human rights system to effectively promote and protect 
women’s human rights in the mainstream. The strategy of 
transforming the mainstream is not yet complete.
But this does not mean that the strategy of transfor-
mation has failed. After all, the HRC and the CESCR 
are frequently addressing issues that characteristically 
affect the enjoyment of human rights by women and 
formulate obligations for States that address these issues. 
Rather, the study shows that continued steps need to be 
taken to carry on the process of transformation.23 More 
information is needed to aid in this work. The study did 
not encompass the work of all mainstream human rights 
bodies and further research is required to determine 
whether other monitoring bodies, like the Committee 
against Torture and the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination, have also taken the call of the 
1993 Vienna Conference to “integrate” women’s human 
rights into their deliberations and findings to heart. A 
second important question relates to the motivation of 
Final Remarks
Since its inception in 1945, the UN has made considerable 
progress in the promotion and protection of women’s 
human rights. Although it started in its early years with 
granting women equal rights—like the right to vote and the 
right to hold public office— it failed to address situations 
that characteristically hinder women in their enjoyment of 
human rights. Nowadays the UN human rights monitoring 
bodies recognize, inter alia, that women have a right to 
maternal health care, that States have the obligation to 
prosecute and punish all forms of violence against women, 
that women should have access to contraceptives, and that 
trafficking in women should be eliminated (Van Leeuwen 
235-246). But, as noted, more than seventy years after the 
UN laid down its aim to promote and protect the rights 
of all, there is also room for improvement, as the system 
still does not fully and effectively promote and protect 
women’s enjoyment of human rights. 
While the full transformation of the mainstream recog-
nition of women’s human rights is not in sight, it is clear 
that the promotion and protection of women’s human 
rights can be effective. The commitment to women’s 
human rights made in 1993 at the World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna is not a short-term assignment 
for the human rights monitoring bodies; it is not a matter 
of adding and stirring women’s experiences into the big 
bowl of international human rights. Rather, it is a process 
that will be ongoing for as long as gender inequality exists. 
It is a process that requires the commitment of everyone 
involved in order to continue to transform the interna-
tional system and to ensure that it fully accommodates 
Although the HRC and the CESCR are on the right track, more needs to 
be done for the international human rights system to effectively promote 
and protect women’s human rights in the mainstream. The strategy 
of transforming the mainstream is not yet complete. But this does not 
mean that the strategy of transformation has failed. 
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and responds to human rights abuses and constraints that 
are typical of women’s lives, now and in the future.
In this process, the role of CEDAW should not be dis-
carded. Transforming the mainstream human rights system 
will likely only be successful if there is also attention for 
women’s rights by a specialized committee. In this regard, 
it should be noted that when the Vienna Conference 
called for transformation in 1993, it also intended to 
strengthen the Women’s Convention. The Declaration 
and Programme of Action of the World Conference on 
Human Rights lays down that “The United Nations should 
encourage the goal of universal ratification by all States 
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women by the year 2000. Ways 
and means of addressing the particularly large number of 
reservations to the Convention should be encouraged” 
(Part 2, para. 39).
The intention of the Vienna Conference was clearly 
to follow a two-track approach in addressing human 
rights of women: by the mainstream and by a specialized 
monitoring body.24 There is widespread agreement among 
women’s rights scholars and activists that the human 
rights of women can best be promoted and protected, at 
the international legal level, through a combination of 
mainstream and specialist institutions and procedures.25 
It would be interesting in this regard to study the relation 
between the work of CEDAW and that of the mainstream 
human rights bodies in the promotion and protection 
of women’s human rights. What is the added value of 
CEDAW? What can the mainstream human rights bodies 
learn from CEDAW?
The story of the UN and the promotion and protection 
of women’s human rights is not finished. It is a work in 
progress. But in the last sixty-five years the system has, 
step by step, come a long way.
This is a revised version of the paper “The United Nations 
and the Promotion and Protection of Women’s Human Rights: 
A Work in Progress,” previously published in The Women’s 
Convention Turned 30, ed. I. Westendorp (Cambridge: 
Intersentia, 2012): 13-29. 
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Endnotes
1The Charter of the United Nations (UN) was signed on 
26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the 
UN Conference on International Organization, and came 
into force on 24 October 1945.
2See, for example, Bunch (“Transforming” 13; “Women’s 
Rights” 487); O’Hare (368-371); Copelon (116-117); 
Cook (Human Rights 3-4; “Women’s International” 231); 
Charlesworth (“What Are Women’s International Human 
Rights?” 59-60; “Human Rights as Men’s Rights” 111); 
Peterson and Parisi (132); Gallagher (283); Okin (34-35); 
Sullivan (126); Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright (625); 
Binion (513, 515).
3“Mainstream” refers in this context to those human rights 
treaties that do not focus specifically on the enjoyment of 
human rights by women.
4See Art. 2, para. 1 and Art. 3 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); and
Art. 2, para. 2 and Art. 3 International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). With regard 
to the specialized treaties see, for example, Art. 2, para. 
1 of the International Convention on the Rights of the 
Child; and Art. 1, para. 1 of the International Convention 
on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families. See on the matter also Pentikäinen (17).
5See, for example, Bunch (“Transforming” 13); the 1999 
World Survey on the Role of Women (ix); Marshall (42).
6See, for example, Bunch (“Transforming Human Rights” 
13); O’Hare (368-371); Copelon (116-117). 
7See, for example, also Peterson and Parisi (141); Loenen 
(255-257); Goldschmidt (13-17).
8The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is an 
authoritative body in the UN system that serves as the 
central forum for discussing international economic and 
social issues. ECOSOC formulates policy recommenda-
tions addressed to member States and the UN system. 
9Following the 2005 report “In Larger Freedom,” by former 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the UN Commission 
on Human Rights (CHR) was replaced by the Human 
Rights Council. See UN doc. A/59/2005, para. 181-183; 
and UN doc. A/RES/60/251 of 2006, which establishes 
the Human Rights Council.
10See, for example, ECOSOC resolution 11 (II), UN doc. 
E/RES/11 (II), para. 1 and ECOSOC resolution 1987/22, 
UN doc. E/RES/1987/22, para. 1. See also “Short History.” 
11Morsink argues that the lack of sexism in the Universal 
Declaration is primarily due to the aggressive lobbying of 
Begtrup and the steady pressure of the Soviet delegation 
(231). Gender refers here to the social construction of 
differences of men and women and ideas of masculinity 
and femininity: “the excess cultural baggage associated 
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with biological sex.” See also Charlesworth (“Feminist 
Methods,” 379).
12UN GA Resolution 1921 of 5 December 1963, UN 
doc. A/RES/1921(XVIII).
13Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, UN GA resolution 2263 (XXII), UN doc. A/
RES/48/104. For a more elaborate overview of the work 
of the CSW see also “Short History.”
14 See on this matter also Holtmaat (7); Loenen (268-70).
15See, for example, Byrnes (205-206); Gallagher (285); 
Johnstone (151); Charlesworth and Chinkin (218); 
Charlesworth (“Not Waving” 1; “Transforming” 445-6); 
Reanda (12).
16Nowadays UN Women. Since January 2008, CEDAW 
is serviced by the OHCHR and meets both in Geneva 
and New York. See UN doc. A/RES/62/218.
17Reanda moreover, speaks of a “ghettoization” of ques-
tions relating to women; the concerns of women will be 
relegated to mechanisms with generally less resources and 
power than the mainstream human rights mechanisms. 
18See, also, O’Hare, (367-368); Charlesworth (“What Are 
Women’s International Human Rights?” 59).
19For a more elaborate summary of the activities of the 
women’s rights movement at these conferences see, for 
example, Friedman; Zinsser; Van Den Brink.
20This call was a repetition of the statement made that 
same year by the CHR in its resolution 1993/46 of 1993, 
UN doc. E/CN.4/RES/1993/46.
21The call for transformation is sometimes understood as a 
call for “gendermainstreaming.” But gendermainstreaming 
and transformation, or integration of the status and human 
rights of women, as requested at the World Conference on 
Human Rights in 1993, are not one and the same. As Van 
den Brink notes in her dissertation of 2006 integration 
of human rights of women can be considered to be an 
important component of gender mainstreaming, but the 
concept of gender mainstreaming is broader and reaches 
beyond the scope of equal enjoyment of human rights: it 
requires, Van den Brink notes, the integration of gender 
in all areas of policy making and execution (37-38). The 
policy of gendermainstreaming, reaching beyond the scope 
of promotion and protection of women’s human rights, 
will not be discussed in this paper.
22See, for the study and its results, Van Leeuwen.
23Besides addressing the lack of attention of the HRC and 
the CESCR for discrimination against women as a root 
cause of human rights violations, also some other sugges-
tions for improvement were made in the conclusions of 
the study on the work of the HRC and the CESCR. See 
Van Leeuwen (235-246).
24See also the report of the expert group meeting on the 
development of guidelines for the integration of a gender 
perspective into human rights activities and programmes, 
UN doc. E/CN. 4/1996/105, para. 24.
25See, for example, Gallagher (331); Mertus and Goldberg 
(207). 
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